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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIFTH AMENDMIENT PROHIBITS EM-
PANELING A SECOND JURY WHERE FIRST JURY WAS DISCHARGED
DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF PROSECUTION WITNESS - Petitioner
was indicted in federal district court for forging checks he
had stolen from the mails. On the day preceding the trial, the
prosecutor learned that his key witness had not been located and,
consequently, had not been served with a subpoena to appear
at the trial. The marshal informed him, however, that there
remained a possibility that service would be effected. When the
case was called for trial the following morning, the prosecutor
answered ready, although he was unable at that time to ascertain
the presence of this witness. A jury was selected, sworn but
then excused until the afternoon. Prior to reconvening, the pros-
ecutor was informed by the marshal that the witness had not
been found; therefore, he asked the court to discharge the jury.
Over petitioner's objection, the application was granted. Two
days later, when the case was again called and a second jury
sworn, petitioner pleaded former jeopardy. The plea was over-
ruled and he was subsequently convicted. The United States
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed, holding that petitioner
had been subjected to double jeopardy, since the absence of the
witness for the prosecution was not such an "urgent necessity"
as to justify a discharge of the jury. Downum v. United States,
372 U.S. 734 (1963).
The prohibition against double jeopardy is an ancient doctrine,
accepted without question in the United'States. 1  Among the many
1Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). "It seems always
to have been imbedded in every system of jurisprudence, as it is 'a part of
the universal law of reason, justice and conscience.'" Mullins v. Common-
wealth, 258 Ky. 529, 530, 80 S.W.2d 606, 607 (1935). For an interesting
discussion of the historical background of the double jeopardy doctrine,
see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121, 151-55 (1959). In that case the Supreme Court held that a
prosecution in the state court for the same crime that defendant had been
acquitted of in the federal court did not amount to double jeopardy under
the fifth amendment. The holding followed the view expressed by the federal
courts and a majority of state courts. See cases cited in Bartkus, supra
at 133-36. The prohibition is expressed in the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution as well as in the constitutions of forty-one states. In
the remaining jurisdictions it is recognized by statute or common law. 1
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 299-301 (12th ed. 1957).
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reasons given to justify this rule have been the unnecessary ex-
pense to the public involved in successive trials, the increased like-
lihood of convicting an innocent person, and the right of the
defendant to be free from undue anxiety and harassment.2 In
addition, this doctrine furnishes the necessary respect and support
for the criminal processes.3 Because a second trial is, in effect,
a statement that the first was a nullity, all trials might be viewed
with doubt. It would also be unreasonable for a court to strictly
apply a standard of fairness during a trial, if the trial itself may
be disregarded.4
Since it is second jeopardy that is forbidden by the fifth
amendment, it follows that a person must have undergone initial
jeopardy before he can claim the defense.5 Jeopardy is the
danger of conviction and punishment with which a defendant
is faced when he is put on trial in a criminal action.6 When the
claim of double jeopardy is made, it becomes necessary to ascertain
whether the accused had in fact been in jeopardy at a former
prosecution. Although a person is not put in jeopardy until the
trial,7 there are differences of opinion at what stage of the trial
it actually attaches.
If the defendant is tried by jury, it is generally agreed that
jeopardy attaches when the entire jury has been empaneled and
sworn.8 If the defendant was tried by a court sitting without
a jury, either because he waived the jury or because he was not
entitled to one, jeopardy attaches when the production of evidence
is begun, i.e., after the first witness is sworn.9 Thus, the basic
2 Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Con-
stitution, 28 U. CHi. L. REv. 591, 592 (1961). "[T]he State with all its
resources and powers should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense. . . ." Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
3 Fisher, supra note 2, at 593.
4 Ibid.
5 Some courts have held, however, that the defense of double jeopardy
may only be sustained in a capital case. People v. Ellis, 15 Wend. 371 (N.Y.
1836). See also Commonwealth v. Commander, 10 Pa. D. & C. 275 (1928),
holding that a plea of former jeopardy was good as to a charge of first
degree murder, but not good as to a charge of murder in the second
degree.
6 Comment, 5 N.Y.L.F. 393, 394 (1959).
7 See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688 (1949).
8 See 1 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 308-09. Some courts in the
past have held, however, that jeopardy does not attach until a verdict has
been rendered, Anderson v. State, 86 Md. 479, 38 Atl. 937 (1897), or until
the court itself has entered judgment thereon, United States v. Haskell,
26 Fed. Cas. 207, 212 (No. 15321) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). Compare United
States v. Kraut, 2 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1932), where the court said:
"[B]eing put on trial involves the impaneling of the jury and the production
of some evidence." Id. at 19. (Emphasis added.)
9 Clawans v. Rives, 104 F2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939); 1 WHARTON, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 309-10.
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issue of when jeopardy attaches, depends upon whether it was a
jury or non-jury trial.
The American Law Institute, in its Model Penal Code, rejects
this approach as being arbitrary, unreasonable and unnecessary.10
The Model Code selects the swearing of the first witness as
the time when jeopardy attaches, regardless of who will weigh
the evidence." Under the Model Code, the first question there-
fore is: was a witness sworn?
Although jeopardy generally' attaches when the jury is
sworn, in certain instances a second trial may be had even though
the jury, which was empaneled to hear the first trial, was dis-
charged without rendering a verdict. The guiding principles in
such a situation were set down by the United States Supreme
Court in 1824 in United States v. Perez. 2  In that case, the
jury, without 'defendant's consent, was discharged because they
were unable to agree on a verdict. The question on appeal was
whether a discharge of the jury under those circumstances was a
bar to another trial for the same offense.
In answering this question, the Court stated:
[I]n all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with
the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in
their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a
manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise
be defeated.' 3
This "manifest necessity" of the circumstances must be. coupled
with the sound discretion of the trial court. 14 This test has been
followed in all jury discharge cases.15
The "hung jury," as in Perez, is perhaps the most common
situation in which the jury may be discharged without reaching
a verdict and a second empaneled. 16 But it is by no means the
sole situation. In Simmons v. United States17 a juror stated
'OMoDEL PENAL CODE § 1.09, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
I1 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
1222 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
13 Id. at 580. (Emphasis added.)
14 Concerning the power to discharge the jury, the Court stated: "[T]he
power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances,
and for very plain and obvious causes. . . . [T]he security which the
public have for .the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of this dis-
cretion, rests . . . upon the responsibility of the judges, under their oaths
of office." Ibid.
15 Wade v. Hunter, supra note 7, at 690.
c16 See ases cited in 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, 321-22
(1957).17 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
[ VOL. 38
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on his voir dire examination's that he did not know defendant
and had never seen him before. After the jury had been sworn
and evidence introduced, it came to the attention of the court
that the juror had lied. The jury was discharged over defendant's
objection and another was empaneled. Defendant was convicted
after his plea of former jeopardy was overruled. In affirming,
the Supreme Court held that when the jury is being sworn, and
facts exist of which the trial court is ignorant, that court may,
in the exercise of its discretion, discharge the jury and empanel
another. The court may likewise exercise this discretion where,
during the trial, the jurors have been subjected to outside influences
and have thereby become biased either in favor of, or against,
the defendant. The Court stated: "There can be no condition
of things in which the necessity for the exercise of this power
is more manifest, in order to prevent the defeat of the ends of
public justice. . . ." 19
More recently, in Wade v. Hunter,20 the Supreme Court was
faced with the question of whether the rapid advance of the United
States Army during the invasion of Germany, and the consequent
difficulty of locating key witnesses, justified the withdrawal of
the charges in a court-martial and the ordering of a new trial
by another tribunal. The Court, following the "manifest necessity"
test of Peres, found that under the circumstances presented, the
second court-martial was not the kind of double jeopardy that was
within the ambit of the fifth amendment. The petitioner urged
the Court to adopt the rule of Cornero v. United States,21 a
leading Court of Appeals case, which held that the absence of
witnesses can never justify the discontinuance of a trial. The
Court refused to take this view, stating:
Such a rigid formula is inconsistent with the guiding principles of the Perez
decision to which we adhere. Those principles command courts in
18The voir dire examination is the interrogatory method whereby the
jury is selected. The questions are propounded either by the court or by
the attorneys, or by both the court and the attorneys. A juror may
generally be excused from serving either for cause or, pre-emptively,
without cause. See BLAcx, LAW DIcrIoNARY, 1746 (4th ed. 1951).
'9 Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 154 (1891). Accord, Thompson
v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894), where after the jury was sworn
and one witness had testified, the court learned that one of the jurors was
disqualified from serving because he had been a member of the grand
jury that had returned the indictment.
20 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
21 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931). In Cornero, a jury was empaneled and
sworn and a five day continuance was granted in order to locate two
government witnesses. When they could not be found the jury was dis-
charged. Two years later a second trial was commenced. Defendant's
plea of former jeopardy was overruled, and he was convicted. The Court
of Appeals reversed.
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considering whether a trial should be terminated without judgment to
take 'all circumstances into account' and thereby forbid the mechanical
application of an abstract formula. The value of the Perez principles thus
lies in their capacity for informed application under widely different
circumstances without injury to defendants or to the public interest.22
In 1961, the Supreme Court, in Gori v. United States,23 held
that a second trial did not violate the prohibition against double
jeopardy where the first trial had been terminated by the trial
judge's declaration of a mistrial sua sponte. On the meager record,
the Court could not determine the lower court's reason for
declaring the mistrial; nevertheless, the Court found this action
to be within the discretion of the trial judge.2 4  Since this
discretion was declared to be of controlling importance, the Court
refused "to scrutinize with sharp surveillance the exercise of
that discretion." 25
In the principal case the Supreme Court was faced with the
question of whether the absence of the key prosecution witness
was such an urgent necessity as to justify the discharge of a
jury and permit a subsequent trial without violating the prohibition
against double jeopardy. The petitioner asked the Supreme Court
to adopt the Cornero rule, which it had rejected in the Wade
case.
Although the Court expressly declined to say that the absence
of a witness can never be a sufficient circumstance to justify the
discharge of a jury, the Court reasoned that the facts in this
case did not warrant the discharge. The Court quoted the
language of Cornwro which it considered determinative of the issue
involved.
The situation presented is simply one where the district attorney entered
upon the trial of the case without sufficient evidence to convict. This does
not take the case out of the rule with reference to former jeopardy. There
is no difference in principle between a discovery by the district attorney
immediately after the jury was impaneled that his evidence was insufficient
anl a discovery after he had called some or all of his witnesses.2 6
The Court then proceeded to lay down a very broad test
to be employed in criminal actions in federal courts.2 7  When any
22 Wade v. Hunter, 336-U.S. 684, 691 (1949).
23367 U.S. 364 (1961).
24 "Where, for reasons deemed compelling by the trial judge, who is best
situated intelligently to make such a decision, the ends of substantial justice
cannot be attained without discontinuing the trial, a mistrial may be declared
without the defendant's consent and even over his objection, and he may
be retried consistently with the Fifth Amendment!' Id. at 368.
25 Ibid.
26 Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737-38 (1963).
27 The double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment applies only
to federal prosecutions. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 426(1953).
[ VOL. 38
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doubt exists, whether the second trial has placed the defendant
in double jeopardy, the fifth amendment dictates that the defendant
should be released. 28  The Court determined that the only
alternative to this approach was an "unlimited, uncertain, and
arbitrary judicial discretion," which is insufficient to protect the
rights of the accused.
29
The dissent questioned whether the prosecutor's oversight,
in failing to ascertain the presence of his witness prior to swearing
the jury, deprived the petitioner of his rights without a trial.
Relying on the Perez test, they found no violation of petitioner's
rights, since the first jury heard no evidence, the delay was only
two days with no continued or prolonged anxiety, and no ad-
ditional expense or embarrassment was suffered by petitioner.
Where such circumstances exist, the dissent believed that the
decision of the majority only results in preventing the government
from fairly presenting its case without any corresponding benefit
to anyone but the accused. It objected to the view of the
majority which apparently will preclude the trial judge from exer-
cising his discretion in this type of situation. Rather, they felt
there is no justification in freeing a defendant "because of the
harmless oversight of the prosecutor." 3
The dissent drew a distinction between this "harmless over-
sight" and the situation where the prosecutor is guilty of negligent
preparation or deliberate harassment. If this were the latter
situation, it indicated they might have found double jeopardy.31
By its decision in the instant case, the Supreme Court
appears to have disregarded the Perez principles which have
been used as a guide since 1824. Those principles require that
the trial judge be permitted to exercise his discretion and
discharge the jury if it is manifestly necessary, or if public justice
requires. This rule of flexibility has now apparently been replaced
by a rigid standard which favors the accused whenever there is
any doubt as to former jeopardy.
With the Perez principle apparently having been rejected,
cases such as Wade and Gori, applying that principle, would like-
wise seem to be of no force and effect. In effect, the Court has
adopted the rule of Cornero v. United States. Although the Court
paid lip service to Wade, it felt that the principle contained in
Cornero was correct. Quoting at length from the latter, the
Court intimated that the mere failure of a prosecutor to have his
key witness ready to testify is equivalent to a finding that he has
2sDownum v. United States, supra note 26, at 738.
29 Ibid.
3 0 Id. at 743 (dissenting opinion).
3' Id. at 742 (dissenting opinion).
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failed to make out a prima facie case because of insufficient
evidence. 32
This decision also indicates that the Supreme Court has
retained the traditional approach that jeopardy attaches when the
jury is sworn, even though the first witness has not taken the
stand and no evidence has been produced. Thus, the Court has
apparently rejected the test employed by the Model Penal Code.
This choice is unfortunate, for it continues an illogical distinction
between jury and non-jury trials. In all cases, jeopardy should
attach at the same stage of the proceedings, regardless of who
is the trier of the facts.33
The rigid standard which the Supreme Court has adopted
runs counter to many of its prior decisions in this area, which
generally stressed flexibility. 34 The reason for choosing this course
is not apparent, since no widespread abuse of discretion by trial
courts seems to exist. While it is important to safeguard the
rights of those accused of crime, we should also keep in mind
that the fair administration of justice demands that the public
be permitted to try the accused. This "public right" ought not
to be defeated because of an inconsequential failure of the
prosecutor to have the witnesses in the courtroom.
M
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - MEXICAN DIVORCE WHERE BOTH
PARTIES APPEARE DECLARED INVALID. - In an action for separa-
tion, the defendant husband counterclaimed for annulment alleging
that a Mexican divorce procured by his wife from her former
spouse was a nullity. Both parties appeared in the Mexican
action, the plaintiff personally and her former husband by appointed
attorney. In granting the annulment and declaring the divorce
invalid, the New York Supreme Court held that since neither
spouse was domiciled in Mexico, the foreign court was without
jurisdiction as we commonly understand that term. Wood v. Wood,
(Sup. Ct.), 150 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 1963, p. 5, col. 7.
New York attorneys are very often confronted with the
necessity of advising their clients on foreign divorce because
"New York's antiquated divorce law just simply does not resolve
the problem when the parties to a marriage have reached the end
32 See text accompanying note 26 .upra.
33 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.09, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
34 See, e.g., Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 648 (1949); United States v.
Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
[ VOL. 38
